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In the Suprelne Court of the State of Idaho 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE ) 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE ) 






TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 
defendant law firm. ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATED 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38933-2011 
Ada County Docket No. 2010-4458 
A STIPULATED MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO 
IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 30 was filed by counsel for Appellants on October 13, 2011. 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellants' STIPULATED MOTION TO AUGMENT 
RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents 
listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Affidavit of Plaintiff Justin S. Reynolds in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, 
with attachments, file-stamped February 14,2011; and 
2. Affidavit of Yolanda Hays, with attachments, file-stamped February 14,2011. 
f:' 
DATED this ~ day of October 2011. 
For the Supreme Court 
I , ; 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Cierk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATED MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - Docket No. 
38933-2011 
Robert C. Huntley ISB#894 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC 
815 W. Washington Street 
P.O. Box 2188 




Attorney for Plaintiffs 
NO.--__ ""Ciii;;:;-___ _ 
FILED A.M., ____ P.M,, ___ _ 
FEB 1 4 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk 
By ABBY GARDEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 




TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually 
and in his capacity as a member of the 
Defendant Law Finn, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 1004458 
Affidavit of Plaintiff Justin S. Reynolds 
in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this action and am one of the owners of Sunrise 
Development, LLC which was the Plaintiff in Sunrise Development, LLC v. Quasar 
Development, LLC., Ada County Case No. CV OC 0717098. 
Affidavit of Justin S. Reynolds - 1 
2. I make the statements in this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and 
belief. 
3. The Defendants herein, that is, the firm of Trout, Jones, Gledhill, Fuhnnan, P .A. 
and David T. Krueck, represented Sunrise Development, LLC in its case against Quasar 
Development, LLC, referenced above (hereinafter "Quasar" case). 
4. In the Quasar proceedings the Defendants seldom, if ever, provided me or any 
other officer or agent of Sunrise Development with copies of the pleadings in that action. 
Specifically, we were never provided with the response memorandum by the Defendant Quasar 
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment file December 21, 2007 nor were we provided with 
a copy of Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
February 6, 2008. 
5. In Judge Williamson's Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Appendix A hereto), the Court stated in part at page 3: 
"b. The moving party shall file any supplemental affidavits or reply briefs within 
seven days of the filing of the opposing brief. 
... ... * 
Defendant filed its opposing memorandum and affidavit on December 21, 2007. 
Plaintiff did not file its reply memorandum until February 8, 2008. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs' reply memorandum was due by December 28, 2007. 
* ... * 
In this case, the Reply was filed over a month late and contrary to the Court's 
Scheduling Order. Therefore, as a sanction for failing to comply with the Court's 
order the Reply is stricken and will not be considered." 
6. Our attorneys did not advise us that the Defendants' response brief raised any 
issue about the failure of our attorneys to specify a time deadline for return of earnest monies 
Affidavit of ;Justin S. Reynolds - 2 
under the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement which they drafted for us. Further, our 
attorneys never advised us that they had failed to file their reply brief by the Court ordered 
deadline and they did not advise us that the Court rejected the "late filed brief." It was not until 
after the Court's Order on Summary Judgment that I or any officer of Sunrise became aware of 
the deficiency in the drafting of the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement in its failure to 
specify a date or time deadline for refund of the earnest money. 
7. Had the deficiency not existed, Judgment would have been entered immediately 
for the refunding of the $60,000 earnest money and it would have been immediately recorded by 
___ us--in -the -offices of .the Co.unty--.Rec.order in both Ada and Canyon Counties. I was very much 
aware of the activities of Quasar dUring that time period and the months which followed and was 
aware of the fact that Quasar had properties against which the Judgment would have attached. 
Attached hereto as Appendix B are copies of records from the Ada County Recorder's office. 
Page 1 is a list of Ada County properties held by Quasar during the time period and pages 2 
through 6 list in highlight the real estate transactions Quasar made during the relevant time 
period. 
8. As a result of the defective Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement, Plaintiffs 
herein have suffered the damages listed in our Complaint, including as a minimum the final 
award in the Stipulated Judgment of Judge Williamson in Quasar of $70,488.81, plus an 
additional $7,000 plus interest. 
DATED this 11th day of February, 2011. 
Affidavit of JustiD S. Reynolds - 3 
On this 11th day of February, 2011, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Justin S. Reynolds, known or identified to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
Affidavit of Justin S. Reynolds - 4 
~- . FILED 
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MAR 11 2003 
IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SUNRlSE DEVELOPMENT, Il..C .• 













Case No. CV-OC 07-1709 
Plaintiff 
v. 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
QUASAR DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an 





February 13, 2008 
Plaintiff-David Krueck, Burt Willie (Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhnnan) 
Defendants-Michael Spink, Richard Andrus (Spink Butler) 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment & Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: 
This suit for breach of a real estate purchase agreement was filed September 25. 2007. 
On July 21, 2006, the parties entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") 
in which the Plaintiff agreed to purchase real property located in Ada County. Idaho. from the 
Defendant under certain tenns and conditions. 
One of the terms required the Defendant to record the final plat no later than July 31. 
2007. which Defendant failed to do. The Agreement provided under section 7(a), entitled. 
Closing and Related Matters: "In the event Seller fails to record the final plat of the Subdivision 
with the Ada County Recorder's Office by July 31, 2007, Buyer may. at its sole discretion, 
1 APPENDIX 1\ 
terminate this Agreement upon written notice to Seller, and Buyer may then obtain a full refund 
of the Earnest Money without any further obligations under the tenus of this Agreement." In 
dispute is what is meant by the phrase ··full refund of the Earnest Money." 
The Agreement laid out the purchase price and the payment tenns, which caned for three 
separate deposits, coiJectively referred to as the Earnest Money. The Agreement provided the 
following in section 2(a): 
The Purchase Price shan be payable in the following manner. 
Earnest Money. SeHer acknowledges that Buyer has already deposited the sum of 
$5,000.00 (the "Initial Deposit'') with [the escrowee). The InitUil Deposit sludl 
become non~refundable to Buyer. and shan be released to the Seller on the 
Approval Date, defined below. Within two business days following the execution 
of this Agreement, Buyer shall deposit an additional sum of $25.000.00 (the 
"Additjonal Deposit") with [the escrowee]. TIu Additional Deposit shall become 
non-refundable to Buyer, and shall be released to Seller, on the Approval Date. 
[The escrowee] shall hold the Initial pepositJID.dJhe Additional-Deposit under the 
standard escrow instructions currently in use by TREG until release to Seller, as 
set forthherein. Upon the Approval Date, Buyer shall pay to Seller an amount 
equal to $30.000.00 (the "Approval Deposit") within sixty days follOwing 
execution of this Agreement. The Initial Deposit. the Additional Deposit, and the 
Approval Deposit may be colJectively referred to herein as the "Earnest Money", 
The Earnest Money shaH be held by returned to Buyer or delivered to Seller in 
accordance with the terms hereof. The Earnest Money shall be applicable to the 
purchase Price at Closing. provided that the transaction contemplated by this 
Agreement proceeds through Closing. 
(emphasis added). Plaintiff deposited the $60,000 Earnest Money as required above. The 
Approval date was defined as August 7. 2006. 
Defendant failed to record the final plat by July 31. 2007. and Plaintiff sent a letter 
invoking its right to terminate the Agreement and obtain a refund of the Earnest Money. 
Defendant refused to pay the fun $60,000, arguing that only the refundable portions of the 
Earnest Money. or $30,000, need be paid. Suit was filed on September 25, 2007, and this motion 
for summary judgment was filed December 4,2007. The primary issue here is whether section 
7(a) contemplated the term "full refund of the Earnest Money'· to inc1ude an Earnest Money, 9r 
only those portions that were refundable. Secondarily, Defendants assert that regardless of how 
much money is owed to Plaintiffs, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether or 
not a reasonable time has passed from the date of Plaintifrs letter demanding a refund. 
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM: 
2 
Defendant has moved to strike Plaintiffs' reply memorandum because it was filed late. 
The Court filed a Notice of Hearing on Summary Judgment and Scheduling Order on December 
7. 2001. It -laid out the following schedule: 
a. The party opposing the motion shall file its opposing affidavits and answering 
briefs within fourteen days from the flJing date of this order. 
b. The moving party shan file any supplemental affidavits or reply briefs within 
seven days of the filing of the opposing brief. 
NO PAR1Y WILL BE PERMITTED TO FILE ANY AFFIDAVITS OR 
ADDITIONAL BRIEFING AFTER THE TIME PERIODS SET FORTH IN. 
THIS ORDER WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE COURT. 
Defendant filed its opposing memorandum and affidavit on December 21, 2007. Plaintiff did not 
file its rep]y memorandum until February 8, 2008. Therefore. Plain~trs reply memorandum was 
due by ~cember 28, 2007 ;_..-
_:Rll~56(c) requires reply briefs on- -mot~ons-fef·summary-judgmentto be filed not less 
- ' .. - --_._' 
than? days t>efore the daa:eof the' he-arin-g. However. the rule also allows the Court to alter or 
shorten the time periods arid requirements of Rule 56(c) for good cause. This Court has set time 
periods for fiJing documents on motions for summary judgment that differ from Rule 56(c) to 
anow the Court time to thoroughly review all documents before the hearing. When parties file 
late memoranda and affidavits, it creates difficulty not only for the opposing party, but for the 
Court as well. 
pursuant to Rule 56(c), the Court may "impose costs, attorney fees and sanctions against 
a party" for good cause shown. In this case, the Reply was filed over a month tate and contrary 
to the Court's scheduling order. Therefore, as a sanction for failing to comply with the Court's 
order. the Reply is stricken and will not be considered. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
LEGAL STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
Summary judgment is aILappmpriate remedy jf the ooRtooving pafty's "ple-ddlngs, 
affidavits, and discovery document~ ...• _ read in a l~g~! .~ost [av.()!able to. ~~e Jl~nQloving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476. 50 P.3d 488. 491 (2002) 
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the 
nonmoving party has failed to show an element essential of her case as to which the nonmoving 
3 
party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317. 322 
(l986). 
The burden of proving the absence of material fact is placed upon the moving party. 
Thomas 11. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557. 562 (2002); 
Petricevich \I. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868, 452 P.2d 362, 365 (1969); 
Blickenstaff \I. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572,577.97 P.3d 439, 444 (1969); Thomson, 137 Idaho at 476. 
50 P.3d at 491. In Celolex, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no need to negate the 
nonmoving party's case; instead. the moving party'g burden is discharged when she shows there 
is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Meanwhile, the 
adverse P~y may not rest on "mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. but must respond., by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting forth specific'facts'-showin!'thatthere is a 
genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. S6(e). See Thomas. 138 Idaho at 205; Thomson. 137 Idaho at 
.' 416~·-5(rp."3d at 491; Blickenstaff, 140 Idaho 'at 577. 97··P.3d.al -444 ... The adv~p~y~ust 
make more than just "condusory'assUtloos" and. in~ a mere scintilla of evidence is not 
enough. Blickenstaff. 140 Idaho at 577. 97 P .3d at 444. 
ANALYSIS: 
Plaintiff argues that the contract is unambiguous and requires the refund of all $60,000 of 
the Earnest Money. .Plaintiff points out that the language designating portions of the Earnest 
Money as "non-refundable" may have effect in certain factual scenarios. but not in this case. 
Defendant argues that the contract is unambiguous and requires the refund of only $30.000 of the 
Earnest Money, because the provision regarding Earnest Money is specific and therefore controls 
over the general prOVision regarding the result of Defendant's failure to record the final plat. 
When the meaning of a contract is in dispute, the court must first detennine whether or 
not the contract is ambiguous. Bondy \I. Levy. 121 Idaho 993. 997, 829 P.2d 134~ 1346 (1992). 
In resolvjng this question, the Court must construe the contract as a whole and not by an isolated 
.phrase. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. \I. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co •• 141 Idaho 660, 663. 115 P.3d 
-:::~-:::.: ... :::·.-==-=75lT1S4-l2IK)5) (eltini Sellin Seed Co. \I. Stcae Ins. FUIUt 135 Idaho 434. 437, 18 P.3d 956,959 
(2000». In order to d~termine whether the contract is ambiguous, the court must detennine 
whether its teons are reasonably susceptible to conflicting inteIpretations. Id.; City of Chubbuck. 
v. City ofPocateUo, 127 Idaho 198.899 P.2d 411 (1995). 
If the tenns of a contract are clear and unambiguous. the interpretation of the contract's 
meaning is a question of law. See e.g., AdD County Assessor v. Taylor. 124 Idaho 550, 553. 861 
4 
.- , , 
P.2d 1215. 1218 (1993). The purpose of interpreting a contract is to detennine the intent of the 
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. Opportunity, LLC. v. Ossewarde. 136 
Idaho 602. 601. 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002) (citing RUfler v. MclAughlin, lOt Idaho 292, 612 
P.2d 135 (1980». In construing a written instrument, this Court must consider it as whole and 
gi ve meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible. Idaho Power Co. v. 
Cogeneration. inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000). Common words are given the meaning 
applied by l~ymen in daily usage, as opposed to the meaning derived from legal usage, in order 
to effectuate the intent of the parties. AID Ins. Co. v. Annslrong. 119 Idaho 897, 900, 811 P .2d 
507. 510 (Ct. App. 1991). If. on the other hand, the terms of a contract are ambiguous, the 
interpre!uti.on of the con~~ct's.m~aning is a _questi~~ of facl Id.; Bondy, 121 Idaho at 997, 829 
P.ld at 1346. 
The Court detennines that the Agreement is unambiguous, because after reading the fuU 
C(;ontr~eG·ooly- one reasonable-conclusion-can be-reacbed----.The_rdeyanLprovision reads: "In the 
event Seller fails to record the final plat of the Subdivision V/ith the Ada County Recorder's 
Office by Ju]y 31, 2007, Buyer may, at its sole discretion, terminate this Agreement upon written 
notice to Seiler, and Buyer may then obtain a fun refund of the Earnest Money without any 
further obligations under the tenns of this Agreement." As contemplated in section 7(a) of the 
Agreement, if the Defendant fails to record the final plat by July 31,2007, the entire $60.000 of 
the earnest money is refundable if the Buyer so demands. 
Defendant argues that section 2(a) is a specific dause and section 7(a) is a general clause. 
and therefore, section 2(a) prevails. However. the Court disagrees. Instead, the Court deems 
section 2(a) to be a general clause as it relates to the refundability of the Earnest Money. Section 
7(a) is a specific clause describing the consequences of Defendant's failure to file the final plat 
by JuJy 31, 2006, which includes a full refund of the Earnest Money to the Plaintiff. "Special 
provisions will control over general ones where both relate to the same thing." Morgan v. 
Fireslo~ Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506. 518, 201 P.2d 976y 983 (1948). Therefore, section 
7(a) requires Defendant to pay aU $60.000 of the Earnest Money to Plaintiff. 
Plajntiff argues that the langyag,e de~ignating PQrtions. ofihe·-~rn~stMoney as "non-
refundable" may have effect in certain factual scenarios. The Court agrecs-.. ~There are several 
provisions in the contract setting forth the results of one party's failure to perfonn specific duties 
under the contraCt. For instance. section 5(b) states: "In the event of a failure of any condition 
precedent set forth herein, then Buyer may declare this Agreement nulJ and void, in which event 
the refundable Eamest Money. if any. shall be returned to Buyer. and the parties shall have no 
5 
further obligations or liabilities." Section SA(b) states: "in the event of a failure of any other 
condition precedent set forth herein, then SeUer may declare this Agreement null and void, and 
the parties shall have no further obligations or liabilities hereunder. Notwithstanding any other 
, provision contained herein, in the event this Agreement fails to close because of a failure of 
condition precedent 5A(a)(ii) only, Seller agrees to return the Earnest Money fO Buyer .... Both of 
these sections refer to "conditions precedent" specifically laid out in sections 5 and SA of the 
Agreement. Section 5(b) clearly contemplates the return of only the refundable portion of the 
Earnest Money, while section 5A(b) clearly contemplates the return of aU of the, Earnest 
Money-apparentJy the nonrefundable portion as well. 
, The' provision at issue, however. is different from both of those clauses. "In the event 
SeHer fails to record the final plat.of the Subdivision with the Ada County Recorder's Office by 
July 31.2007, Buyer may, at its sole discretion, tenninate this Agreement upon written notice to 
. '-s~ner. andBuyer inay then obiitin a full',e!u;;d o{ihi&lmesc"Money"wfihout any further 
.obligations .. ~nder.1he tenns~f this .. Agreem~n~Unlike.the..abov.e~mentioned 5A(b), this section 
does not state ·'notwithstanding any other provision," which explicitly ignores section 2(a), 
which describes the Initial Deposit and the Additional Deposit as nonrefundable. However, 
section 7(a) requires a "full refund of the Earnest Money" which dearly specifies that all of the 
Earnest Money is to be refunded under this provision. 
Next Plaintiff argues that section 15(1) requires the refund to occur immediately. That 
section stales "time of, the essence: aU times provided for in this Agreement or in any other 
instrument or document referred to herein or contemplated hereby, for the perfonnance of any 
act will be strictly construed, it being agreed that time is of the essence in this Agreement." 
Defendant counters that 7(a) does not state a specific time for paying the refund, and therefore 
performance must merely occur in a reasonable time. The Court agrees that, although the 
Agreement includes a "time is of the essence" clause, section 7(a) does not state a specific time 
for paying the refund. and therefore petfonnance must merely occur in a reasonable time. Ujdur 
v. Thompson, 126 Idaho 6, 9, 878 P.2d 180. 183 (1994) (Holding that when the time for 
--·---"--::--:-:'-:-·~peifonnance·ls not specifieo in a contract, perfCfrrrranClmlusnJccunn--aTeasunaOle-time). 
__ ,:_Jin~IIy,. P~;I!!!!tiff~!ls.§.~~.Jn...i!:s_..reply. :J.h.!LP.@ig[~s,_l3._and , .14 . .nLAlvaro·s affidavit 
should be ignored by the court because they are irrelevant. However, it appears that these 
statements were filed to show that there was an issue of fact as to whether a "reasonable time" 
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This matter having come before the Court upon the parties' Sti~ulation for Entry of 
Judgment and the Covenant Not to Execute, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant in the amount of Sixty 
Thousand and Noll 00 ($60,000.00), plus Plaintiffs costs in the amount of Four Hundred Fifty~ 
Seven and 311100 Dollars ($457.31), plus Plaintiff's attorney fees in the amount ofTen 
Thous~d Thirty-One and 501100 Dollars (SI0,031.50), for a total judgment in the amount of 
ruooMENT-l APPENDIX B 
" 
j" 
Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Eight and 811100 Dollars ($70,488.81), with interest 
accruing at the judgment rate. 
It is hereby ordered, a<ljudged, and decreed this L day of ~. 2008. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. - I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tbis 10-day of ~ .2008, I caused a 
true and correct copy oftbe above JUDGMENT to be serv upon the following in~viduals in 
the manner indicated below: -
Michael T. Spink 
Richard H. Andrus 
Spink Butler, LLP 
251 B. Front Street, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Bolt 639 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 208l388-100t 
David T. Krueck 
ReidW.Hay 
Trout~Jones-Gledhi1l-Fuluman, P.A. 
225 N. 91lt Street, Suite 820 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Bolt 1097 . 
Boise, ID 83701. . 
Facsimile: 2081331-1529 -
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
.---- ---_ ... _--- ._----.-------
ruooMENT-2 
· . . -, . 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the amount of Earnest 
Money due. and DENIED as to whether or not a reasonable time has passed for fun refund of the 
$60,000.00 earnest money deposited. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
EJI~ 
Darla WilJiamson. District Judge 
-- -} 'hereby certify that on this date I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing to: 
Michael T. Spink . 
Richard H. Andrus 
P.O. BoX 639 
Boise. W 83701 
Dated this LI- day of March. 2008 
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TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually 
and in his capacity as a member of the 
Defendant Law Firm, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 1004458 
Affidavit ofYlonda Hays 
Ylonda Hays, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I have been a licensed and practicing realtor in the state of Idaho since 2000 and 
have personal knowledge of the matters herein stated. 
2. I have been informed ofthe Order dated March 11,2008, rendered by Judge Darla 
Affidavit of Ylonda Hays - 1 
Valuation and Analysis, and Real Estate Finance courses and mandates continuing education in 
these areas. 
2. I have been informed of the Order dated March 11,2008, rendered by Judge Darla 
Williamson, granting in part PlaintifI's Motion for Summary Judgment filed in Sunrise 
Development, UC v. Quasar Development, LLC, Ada County Civil Case No. CV OC 07-17098 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
3. In that Order Judge Williamson noted at page 6 that the Real Estate Purchase 
Agreement (''the Agreement") provided that "time was of the essence" but did not specify what 
would be a specific time period for refunding the eamest money if and when the eamest money 
became refundable. Judge Williamson further ruled at page 5 as follows: 
"As contemplated in Section 7(a) of the Agreement, if the Defendant fails 
to record the fmal plat by July 21, 2007, the entire $60,000 of the earnest 
money is refundable if the Buyer so demands." 
Judge Willimnson further ruled that the plat had not been recorded by July 21, 2007, and thus 
that was the date when the earnest money became refundable. 
4. In Appendix A, Judge Williamson ruled that since no date was specified in the 
Agreement, and that there remained a question of fact as to when the refund must be made, that 
that·issue must be the subject offurther litigation. 
5. I have further been made aware of the Judgment entered by Judge W:tlliamson on 
September 10, 2008, based upon the stipulation of the parties (Appendix B hereto), which 
provided for a refunding of the earnest money together with an award of attorney fees and costs, 
totaling $70,488.81 which was subject to a Stay of Execution until August 15, 2009. 
6. During the period between July 21, 2007 and March 11, 2008 and extending on to 
September 10, 2008, I can testify from my personal knowledge of following sales and purchases 
Affidavit ofYloDda Hays - 2 
in Idaho that Quasar Development, LLC was engaged in buying and selling and disposing of real 
estate in Ada and Canyon counties and therefore, during both time periods, any judgment duly 
entered and recorded during either time period would have attached against the properties 
involved and would more likely than not have been a potential source from which Sunrise 
Development, LLC andlor its owners, Justin and S. Kristine Reynolds, could have expected to 
recover all or a substantial portion of their earnest money deposit of $60~OOO. 
7. In addition to my personal knowledge of the sales and transfers of property by 
Quasar Development, LLC during the period between July 21, 2007 and March 11, 2008 and 
during the period between March 11, 2008 and September 10, 2008, I have personally reviewed 
real property transaction records which record sales and transfers by Quasar Development LLC 
of real estate during those periods. Attached hereto as Appendix C are copies of Ada County 
real estate records, vvith page 1 depicting properties owned by Quasar Development LLC during 
the relevant time period and pages 2 through 6 highlighting actual transfers of real estate made 
during the relevant time period. 
8. Appendix D reflects basic Purchase and Sale Agreements that specify how much 
time a Seller has to refund Earnest Money when the Seller is in default. Exa.rw1es of the pmctice 
are the documents attached hereto which provide that an Earnest Money return date specified in 
tenus of "20 days", "15 days", "5 days", "forthwith", "upon demand", "immediately" or at a date 
certain. It is my opinion that the lack of a similar provision in the capital Agreement between 
Sunrise Development LLC and Quasar Development LLC was deficient and prevented Sunrise 
from receiving a timely judgment that would have likely resulted in the recovery of Earnest 
Money. 
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Further sayeth Affiant naught. 
DATED this 11111 day of February, 2011. 
On this 11th day of February, 2011, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Ylonda Hays, known or identified to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed 
the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have 
day and year in. this certificate first abov 
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eunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
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Plaintiff-David Krueck. Burt Willie (Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhnnan) 
Defendants-Michael Spink. Richard Andrus (Spink Butler) 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment & Defendanfs Motion to Strike 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: 
This suit for breach of a real estate purchase agreement was filed September 25, 2001. 
On Ju]y 21,2006, the parties entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") 
in which the Plaintiff agreed to purchase real property located in Ada County, Idaho, from the 
Defendant under certain terms and conditions. 
One of the terms required the Defendant to record the final plat no later than July 31. 
2007, which Defendant failed to do. The Agreement provided under section 7(a), entitled 
Closing and Related Matters: uIn the event Seller fails to record the final plat of the Subdivision 
with the Ada County Recorder's Office by July 31, 2007, Buyer may, at its sole discretion. 
J APPEN.DIX~A.-
";I 
terminate this Agreement upon written notice to Seiter, and Buyer may then obtain a fuil refund 
of the Eamest Money without any further obligations under the terms of this Agreement." In 
dispute is what is meant by the phrase "full refund of the Earnest Money." 
The Agreement laid out the purchase price and the payment tenus, which caned for three 
separate deposits, collectively refe.rred to as the Earnest Money. The Agreement provided the 
following in section 2(a): 
The Purchase Price shan be payable in the fonowing manner. 
Eamest Money. Sener acknowledges that Buyer has already deposited the sum of 
$5.000.00 (the "Initial Deposit") with [the escrowee]. The Initial Deposit shall 
become non-refundable to Buyer, and shall be released to the SeUer on the 
Approval Date, defined below. Within two business days following the execution 
of thiS Agreement, Buyer shall deposit an additional sum of $25.000.00 (the 
"Additional Deposit") with [the escrowee]. The Additional Deposit shall become 
non-refulldable to BlIyer, and shan be released to Seller, on the Approval Date. 
[The escrowee] shall hold the Initial Deposit and the Additional Deposit under the 
standard escrow instructions currently in use by TREG until release to Seller, as 
set forthherein. Upon the Approval Date. Buyer shall pay to Seller an amount 
equal to $30,000.00 (the "Approval Deposit") within sixty days following 
execution of this Agreement. The Initial Deposit, the Additional Deposit, and the 
Approval Deposit may be collectively referred to herein as the "Earnest Money". 
The Earnest Money shall be held by returned to Buyer or delivered to Seller in 
accordance with the tenns hereof. The Earnest Money shall be applicable to the 
Purchase Price at Closing. provided that the transaction contemplated by this 
Agreement proceeds through Closing. 
(emphasis added). Plaintiff deposited the $60,000 Earnest Money as required above. The 
Approval date was defined as August 7, 2006. 
Defendant failed to record the final plat by July 31. 2007. and Plaintiff sent a letter 
invoking its right to terminate the Agreement and obtain a refund of the Earnest Money. 
Defendant refused to pay the full $60,000. arguing that only the refundable portions of the 
Earnest Money, or $30,000, need be paid. Suit was filed on September 25, 2007. and this motion 
for summary judgment was filed December 4. 2007. The primary issue here is whether section 
7(a) contemplated the term "fuH refund of the Earnest Money" to include aU Earnest Money, or 
only those portions that were refundable. Secondarily. Defendants assert that regardless of how 
much money is owed to Plaintiffs. there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether or 
not a reasonable time has passed from the date of Plaintiffs letter demanding a refund 
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM: 
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Defendant has moved to strike Plaintiffs' reply memorandum because it was filed late. 
The Court fi Jed a Notice of Hearing on Summary Judgment and Scheduling Order on December 
7.2007. It '1 aid out the following schedule: 
a. The party opposing the motion shall file its opposing affidavits and answering 
briefs within fourteen days from the filing date of this order. 
b. The moving party shall file any supplemental affidavits or reply briefs withi. 
seven days of the filing of the opposing brief. 
NO PARTY WILL BE PERMITTED TO FILE ANY AFFIDAVITS OR 
ADDITIONAL BRIEFING AFI'ER THE TIME PERIODS SET FORTH IN. 
THIS . ORDER WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE COURT. 
Defendant filed its opposing memorandum and affidavit on December 21, 2007. Plaintiff did not 
file its reply memorandum until February 8, 2008. Therefore. Plaintiff's reply memorandum was 
due by Decem~r 28, 2007. 
_Rule. 56(c} requires reply briefs ·on motions-for·-summary-judgment to be filed not less 
than 7 days before the date of the hearing. Ho\yever, the rule also allows the Court to alter or 
shorten the time periods and requirements of Rule 56(c) for good cause. This Court has set time 
periods for filing documents on motions for summary judgment that differ from Rule 56(c) to 
allow the Court time to thoroughly review an documents before the hearing. When parties file 
late memoranda and affidavits, it creates difficulty not only for the opposing party, but for the 
Court as well 
pursuant to Rule 56(c), the Court may "impose costs, attomey fees and sanctions against 
a party" for gOOd cause shown. In this case, the Reply was filed over a month late and contrary 
to the Court's scheduling order. Therefore, as a sanction for failing to comply with the Court's 
order, the Reply is stricken and will not be considered. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
LECAL STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
Summ.ID judgment is an appropriate ICmedy if the RQRmOVing p~!p1eadings. 
--~----'==-
affidavits, and discovery documents ~ .. ,read in a I~.~~ .lJ)ost f.avo!8ble to _ t!'elJ~ll,moving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002) 
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when tt.e 
nonmoving party has failed to show an element essential of her case as to which the nonmoving 
3 
party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 
(1986). 
The burden of proving the absence of material fact is placed upon the moving party. 
Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A.. 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557. 562 (2002); 
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868, 452 P.2d 362, 365 (1969); 
Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577,97 P.3d 439. 444 (1969); Thomson. 137 Idaho at 476, 
50 P.3d at 491. In Celotex, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no need to negate the 
nonmoving party's case; instead, the moving party's burden is discharged when she shows there 
is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex,477 U.S. at 325. Meanwhile. the 
adverse party may not rest on "mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must respond, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting forth specific factS showing thatTnere is a 
genuine issue for trial." IR.e.p. 56(e). See Thomas, 138 Idaho at 205; Tlwmson, 137 Idaho at 
476~5(fP.3dat-491;miCkenstaff, 140-Idaho~ai 577.97 pjd at 444. The ad~~~-p~y must 
make more ihan just "concJusory assertions" and. indeed, a mere scintilla of evidence is not 
enough. Blickenstaff, 140 Idaho at 517. 97 P.3d at 444. 
ANALYSIS: 
Plaintiff argues that the contract is unambiguous and requires the refund of all $60,000 of 
the Earnest Money. ,Plaintiff points out that the language designating portions of the Earnest 
Money as "non-refundable" may have effect in certain factual scenarios. but not in this case. 
Defendant argues that the contract is unambiguous and requires the refund of only $30,000 of the 
Earnest Money, because the provision regarding Earnest Money is specific and therefore controls 
over the general proVision regarding the result of Defendant's failure to record the final plat. 
When the meaning of a contract is in dispute. the coun must first detennine whether or 
not the contract is ambiguous. Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993. 997.829 P.2d 1342. 1346 (l992). 
In resolving this question. the Court must construe the contract as a whole and not by an isolated 
.phrase. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co .• 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 
. 751. 754 (2005) (cltmg Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 437.18 P.3d 956, 959 
(2000». In order to detennine whether the contract is ambiguous, the court must determine 
whether its tennS are reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations. [d.; City of Chubbuck 
v. City of Pocatello, J 27 Jdaho 198. 899 P .2d 411 (1995). 
If the termS of a contract are clear and unambiguous. the interpretation of the contract's 
meaning is a question of Jaw. See e.g., Ada County Assessor v. Taylor, 124 Idaho 550. 553,861 
P.2d 1215, 1218 (1993). The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the 
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. Opportunity. L.LC. v. Ossewarde, 136 
Idaho 602. 607. 38 P.3d·1258. 1263 (2002) (citing Ruuer v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612 
P.2d 135 (1980». In construing a written instrument, this Court must consider it as whole and 
give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible. Idaho Power Co. v. 
Cogeneration, Inc .• 134 Idaho 738. 9 P.3d 1204 (2000). Common words are given the meaning 
applied by laymen in daily usage, as opposed to the meaning derived from legal usage. in order 
to effectuate the intent of the parties. AID Ins. Co. v. Armstrong. 119 Idaho 897. 900~ 811 P.2d 
507, 510 (Ct. App. 1991). If, on the other hand, the terms of a contract are ambiguous. the 
interpretation of the contract's meaning is a question of fact. Id.; Bondy. 121 Idaho at 997. 829 
P.2d at 1346. 
The Court detennines that the Agreement is unambiguous. because after reading the full 
contract~ only one reasonable conclusion can ·bereached. The relevant provision reads: "In the 
event Seller fails to record the final plat of the Subdivision ~th the Ada County Recorder's 
Office by July 31, 2007. Buyer may. at its soJe discretion. terminate this AgreelJlCi1t upon written 
notice to Senet. and Buyer may then obtain a full refund of the Eamest Money without any 
further obligations under the terms of this Agreement." As contemplated in section 7(a) of the 
Agreement. if the Defendant fails to record the final plat by July 31. 2007. the entire $60.000 of 
the earnest money is refundable if the Buyer so demands. 
Defendant argues that section 2{a) is a specifiC clause and section 7(a) is a general clause. 
and therefore. section 2(a) prevails. However. the Court disagrees. Instead, the Court deems 
section 2(a) to be a genera] clause as it relates to the refundability of the Earnest Money. Section 
7(a) is a specific cJause describing the consequences of Defendant's failure to file the final plat 
by July 31, 2006. which includes a full refund of the Eantest Money to the Plaintiff. "Special 
provisions will control over general ones where both relate to the same thing." Morgan v. 
Firesto~ Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506. 518, 201 P.2d 976, 983 (1948). Therefore. section 
7(a) requires Defendant to pay all $60.000 of the Earnest Money to Plaiiniff. 
Plaintiff argues that the ~language' designatIng portions ot the' EamestMoney' as "non--~ 
refundable" may have effect in certain factual scenarios. ·1beCourt agrees;-There are several 
provisions in the contract setting forth the results of one party's failure to perform specific duties 
under the contract. For instance, section 5(b) states: "In the event of a failure of any condition 
precedent set forth herein, then Buyer may declare this Agreement null and void. in which event· 
the refundable Eamest Money, if any, shall be returned to Buyer, and the parties shall have no 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the amount of Earnest 
Money- due, and DENIED as to whether or not a reasonable time has passed for full refund of the 
$60,000.00 earnest money deposited. 
IT IS sO ORDERED . 
. Ji1~ 
Darla Williamson, District Judge 
I hereby certify that on this date I mailed a true and correct cOpy of the above and 
foregoing to: 
Michael T. Spink . 
Richard H. Andrus 
P.O. Box 639 
Boise, ID 83701 
Dated this LI- day of M~h, 2~8 
rJ!'~~ ne Korsen. uty ourtcerk 
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David Krueck 
Burt R. Willie 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 8370 1 
Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Eight and 811100 Dollars ($70,488.81), with interest 
accruing at the judgment rate. 
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed this 'I day of ~. 2008. 
~,d~ 
Darla .• Williamson . 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this fa- day of ,~ ,2008, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the above JUDGMENT to be SefV uponti1efOi1()Wng individuals in 
the manner indicated below: 
Michael T. Spink 
Richard H. Andrus 
Spink Butler, LLP 
251 E .. Front Street, Suite 200 
Boise. ID 837{}2 
P.O. Box 639 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 2081388-1001 
David T. Krueck 
Reid W.Hay 
Trout-Jones.G1edhiIJ-Fuhnnan, P .A. 
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701. _ 
Facsimile: 2081331-1529 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand·Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
------------~- .-~ ........ - --- ._---.---
p~~ eputyCler 
